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THE ABSTENTION DOCTRINE
By RONALD L. NIETO*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last twenty-five years the federal courts have developed
a doctrine by which, in appropriate cases, they may decline to exer-
cise jurisdiction even though their jurisdiction has been properly
invoked. This doctrine has been aptly termed the "abstention doc-
trine." The occasions that call for the application of abstention are
those where the federal court is called upon to decide an issue of
state law under circumstances which require it to defer its decision
in favor of an adjudication by courts of the state concerned. The
circumstances that would require such action by the federal courts
are exceptional ones, and where abstention is employed it must
serve some countervailing interest that overrides the duty of a
federal court to decide a case properly before it. The purpose of
this paper will be to examine the abstention doctrine and the cir-
cumstances that require its use.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE
A. Federal Jurisdiction Could Not Be Declined
The idea that federal courts were under an imperative duty to
exercise their jurisdiction in every case that properly came before
them was one which the courts adhered to for many years. It prob-
ably sprang from dictum uttered by Chief Justice Marshall in an
early case: 1
It is most true that this court will not take jurisdiction
if it should not; but it is equally true, that it must take
jurisdiction if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legisla-
ture may, avoid a measure because it approaches the con-
fines of the constitution. We cannot pass it by because it is
doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties,
a case may be attended, we must decide it if it be brought
before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise
of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is
not given. The one or the other would be treason to the
constitution. Questions may occur which we would gladly
avoid, but we cannot avoid them. All we can do, is to exer-
cise our best judgment, and conscientiously to perform our
duty.2
While this dictum may not have been followed uniformly,* it
had sufficient vitality to preclude serious challenge to the scope
of the federal courts' jurisdiction for a century. Not only did the
courts consider it an absolute duty to exercise their jurisdiction,
they gave short shrift to contentions that they should postpone
such exercise until a court of another jurisdiction could decide the
same issues.4 McClellan v. Carland 5 well illustrates this point. The
Senior student, University of Denver College of Law.
I Wright, The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered, 37 Texas L. Rev. 815 (1959).
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 257, 291 (1821).
3 See note 1 supro.
4 Chicot County v. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529 (1893); Hyde v. Stone, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 170 (1857).
5 217 U.S. 268 (1910).
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circuit court ordered a stay of the federal proceedings while the
state of South Dakota instituted an action in the state court to deter-
mine an escheat to it of the estate in controversy. If the state would
begin the action within a time limit set by the court, the court an-
nounced that it would extend the stay until determination of the
state court action. A decision by the state court would have been
res judicata in the federal proceedings. The Supreme Court re-
versed, saying that the circuit court had virtually abandoned its
jurisdiction and turned the matter over to the state court. "This,
it has been steadily held, a Federal court may not do."6
B. Awareness of Conflict between Sovereignties
Perhaps this idea persisted for so long because, until the early
part of the twentieth century, conflict between the federal and state
jurisdictions was not so apparent as it later became. The federal
courts, under the ruling of Swift v. Tyson,7 were considered to be
the state courts' equals as authoritative interpreters of the state law.
This sometimes resulted in two distinct lines of authority on the
same point of state law,8 and could not have been very pleasing to
state authorities. In such a situation, it is easy to visualize a state
policy being thwarted on occasion by a party resorting to a federal
court which had a different rule of law from the state court's. This
was not a direct interference with state authority and did not create
the friction that could result from direct interference.
Then the Supreme Court handed down the case of Ex parte
Young.9 This established that the eleventh amendment 10 did not bar
injunctions by a federal court against state officers acting in viola-
tion of the Constitution. Accordingly, a federal judge could restrain
state activities as unconstitutional, and incident to this, he could
issue an ex parte interlocutory stay pending determination of the
constitutional question.1 Subsequently, it was held that acts of
state officials, though contrary to but under color of state law, did
constitute state action under the fourteenth amendment.1- These
decisions greatly increased the sensitive area of federal-state con-
flict.
Congress was not long in reacting to these decisions. In 1910,
it put into effect the statute requiring a three judge federal court
to hear petitions for injunctions restraining the action of a state
official.' 3 This same statute provided for direct appeal from such
three judge courts to the Supreme Court. Thus, by this and other
enactments, 14 it can be seen that Congress did not approve of too
6 Id. at 281.
7 41 U.S. (16 Peters) 1 (1842),
8 Kurland, Toward a Co-Operative Judicial Federalism, 24 F.R.D. 481 (1960).
9 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
10 U.S. Const. amend. Xl.
11 See Note, The Pullman Case: A Limitation on the Business of the Federal Courts, 54 Har. L.
Rev. 1379, 1381 (1941).
12 Home Tel, & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913).
13 Act of June 18, 1910 § 17, 36 Stat. 557 (1910), as amended 28 U.S.C. 88 2281, 2284 '1958).
Other legislative limitations on federal court jurisdiction are prohibitions against: injunctions to stay
state court proceedings except where authorized by act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its
jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1958); enjoining assessment,
levy or collection of a state tax under state low where plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be
had in the courts of such state, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1958); enjoining operation of or compliance with
an order affecting a public utility's rates made by a state administrative or rate-making body of
a state where jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of citizenship or repugnance to the Constitu-
tion, and the order does not interfere with interstate commerce, and after reasonable notice ard
hearing, and a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in state courts, 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1958).
14 See note 13 supra.
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great an intereference by federal courts in the affairs of the states.
But the congressional scheme was far from comprehensive. It did
not, and perhaps could not, cover every area of potential conflict.
The federal courts were not unaware of this problem. "Caution
and reluctance" attended the consideration of cases involving local
controversies where there was threat of opposition between state
and federal courts.15 This was especially true where the relief asked
would be in the form of an injunction interfering with the activities
of state officials. 6 It was recognized that there were some issues
which should be adjudicated in the state courts, even though the
federal courts had jurisdiction of the cause. 17 However, the Supreme
Court still re'ained and exercised its power to construe state con-
stitutions and statutes even when it expressly stated its reluctance
to do so,' 8 although it also recognized that the ultimate determina-
tion of the application, construction and interpretation of a state
constitution"1 or s'atute 2 rested with the highest state court. The
Supreme Court expressed its guide to be "the scrupulous regard for
the rightful independence of state governments which should at all
times actuate the federal courts ....
C. The Erie Case
In Erie v. Tompkins,2 2 the Supreme Court finally repudiated
the Swift v. Tyson2 2 doctrine. Thereafter, the substantive law of the
state would be controlling on state issues when decided in federal
courts where jurisdiction is obtained by virtue of diversity of citi-
zenship. Consequently, the federal courts were bound by the deter-
minations of the state courts on state law issues. But it must be
noted that this is all that the Erie case held. Federal courts still had
the power to adjudicate issues of state law; however, they could no
longer formulate their own rules of decision independently of state
court rulings. The problem presented by Erie was the dilemma of
the federal courts when the state law was not clear, either because
there was no authoritative decision by the state court or because
there was a conflict in state authorities..2 4 In such a situation the
federal court was embarrassed by the necessity of deciding the state
law question by a ruling that would be the law of the case only and
that might be proved wrong by a subsequent state court decision.2 5
The problem can be put into focus by considering the alternatives
faced by a federal court in a case where it had jurisdiction by virtue
of diversity and where there are present state law issues and federal
constitutional questions. Assuming a case where the state law au-
thorities on the point at issue are unclear, the federal court is then
faced on the one hand with the well known reluctance to decide a
case on constitutional grounds where other grounds for decision
are available, and on the other hand with a reluctance to decide the
I., Hawks v. Hamil, 288 U.S. 52, 60 (1933).
10 Ibid.
17 See Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 279 U.S. 159 (1929); Cavanaugh v. Looney,
248 U.S. 453 (1919).
1 , Porter v. Investors Syndicate, 287 U.S. 346 (1932).
l9 Glenn v. Field Packing Co., 290 U.S. 177 (1933).
"_4 Lee v. Bickell, 292 U.S. 415 (1934).
21 Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521, 525 (1932).
'2304 U.S. 64 (1938).
:2: See note 7 supra.
"4 Kurland, supra note 8.
".-, Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
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case by a declaration of state law that may subsequently prove to
be wrong because of a contrary determination by the state court.
The policy of the Erie case seems clear. It was a recognition of
the independence of the states in their own sphere of the federal-
state relationship. This policy hit a barrier in those situations men-
tioned, due to the inferior capacity-power, not ability-of the fed-
eral courts .2 6 No legislation covered this area. It remained for the
courts to find their own judicial solution.
D. The Doctrine of the Pullman Case
A partial answer has come in the form of the abstention doc-
trine as enunciated by the Court in the Pullman27 case. Pullman
was not the first case in which the device of abstention was em-
ployed, 28 but it was in this case that it was crystallized and identi-
fied as a doctrine.
Over light passenger runs in Texas, the railroads customarily
carried but one Pullman car. The one car was in charge of a porter,
who was a Negro. The Railroad Commission ordered that no sleep-
ing car was to be operated in Texas unless such car was continu-
ously in charge of a Pullman conductor. The Pullman Company
attacked the order as beyond the power of the Railroad Commission
under the Texas statutes. The Pullman porters intervened as com-
plainants alleging unconstitutionality because of discrimination
against Negroes. The three judge district court found that the Texas
statutes did not uphold the Railroad Commission's exercise of power
and enjoined enforcement of the order. On appeal, the Supreme
Court remanded the cause with directions to retain the bill pending
a prompt determination of the applicability of the Texas statute by
the Texas courts.
The Court found the authority for its action in the traditional
discretion of a court of equity. "An appeal to the chancellor . . . is
an appeal to the 'exercise of the sound discretion, which guides the
determination of courts of equity.' . . . The history of equity juris-
diction is the history of regard for public consequences in employing
the extraordinary remedy of the injunction. 2 9
The Court found that the constitutional question presented a
sensitive area of state policy that should not be entered into unless
no alternative to its adjudication was open. Thus, a consideration of
the state law issue was necessitated. O*n this subject the Court com-
mented that a ruling by the federal court would be merely a fore-
cast of the law, because the final authority, the Supreme Court of
Texas, had not spoken on the scope of the statute. "The reign of law
is hardly promoted if an unnecessary ruling of a federal court is
thus supplanted by a controlling decision of a state court. The re-
sources of equity are equal to an adjustment that will avoid the
waste of a tentative decision as well as the friction of a premature
constitutional adjudication." 0
26 Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the Supreme Court and the Erie Doctrine in Diversity Cases,
67 Yale L. J. 187 (1957).
27 Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., supra note 25.
28 Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573 (1940). Thomoson v.
Magnolia Pet. Co., 309 U.S. 478 (1940); Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176 (1935); Spielman
Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935); Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521 (1932): Langres
v. Green, 282 U.S. 531 (1931); Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 279 U.S. 159 (1929'.




This avoidance of friction was termed by the Court as one of
the public interests having the highest claim on the discretion of
the chancellor. The "contribution of the courts"" based on "impor-
tant considerations of policy,"" - thus emerged as the abstention
doctrine. It is the Court's attempt to further harmonious relations
between state and federal authority.
III. APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE
A. Interwoven Federal Constitutional and State Law Issues
The application of the abstention doctrine is most clear in those
cases where state action is being challenged as contrary to the fed-
eral constitution and state law questions are present in the case."
An early example of this type of case is Gilchrist v. Interborough
Rapid Transit Co.,"4 where the state question was basic to the con-
troversy. The leading case in this area is the Pullman case, dis-
cussed previously.
In Pullman the court found that the constitutional issue touched
"a sensitive area of social policy upon which the federal courts
ought not to enter unless no alternative to its adjudication is
open. ' 'a  In subsequent cases the sensitivity of the state issue has
not been given as great weight as the principle of avoiding an un-
necessary constitutional decision. "" What is most basic in these cases,
although principles of comity are inherent in them, is that by ab-
staining the federal courts avoid the unnecessary adjudication of a
constitutional issue. Mr. Justice Frankfurter has classified the ap-
plication of the abstention doctrine in this area as a phase of the
basic constitutional doctrine that federal courts will determine a
constitutional issue only when no alternative is available.1 7 By sub-
mitting at least the state issues to the state court, the federal courts
give effect to this salutary principle. It is possible that state courts
could give underlying state issues a construction that would avoid
the constitutional issue altogether, or in part,"s or the state court
decision might make determination of the constitutional issue pa-
tently necessary. In any event, the constitutional doctrine will be
served. The Court has indicated that the state courts may be more
likely to give a statute a limiting interpretation than a federal court
wvould.:1:
Another policy recently stated by the Court to be served by
abstention is that by allowing the state courts to first consider the
state issues, the federal court judgment on the constitutional issues
:11 See note 25 supro at 501.
:2 . Ibid.
:: It may be noted here that the Court has not extended abstention to cover cases involving
interwoven state low and non-constitutional federal questions. No case has been found where
abstention has been applied in such a situation. In at least one case, Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S.
472 :1949), the Court has refused to allow abstention where a question of non-constitutional federal
law was intertwined with a state law question. The rationale behind such a result is not entirely
clear. There is evidently no rule requiring a federal court to avoid a decision based on non-consti-
tutional federal grounds where other grounds are available, but it is conceivable that considerations
of comity between state and federal authority could be very strong. Perhaps abstention will be
applied in this class of case in the future. The principle of comity seems as applicable here as
in other situations.
::4 See note 28 supra.
:. See note 25 supra at 498.
-A' Eg., City of Meridian v. So. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 358 U.S. 639 (1959); Shipman v. OuPre,
339 U.S. 321 (1950); Spector Motor Serv. Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (19").
:7 Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 336 (1943) (dissenting opinion).
7" Spector Motor Serv. Inc. v. McLaughlin, supra note 36.
:;t- Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959).
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will be based on "a complete product of the State. '40 Evidently, it
is believed that having a state court interpretation will shed greater
light on the constitutional problem.
The state law issues must be unsettled ones in this area. If there
is no reasonable doubt about the construction, interpretation or ap-
plication of the state law in question,4 the federal court will not
abstain from deciding the issues.42 There may be no reasonable
doubt either because the state issue has already been settled by the
state court or because there is no ambiguity that calls for an inter-
pretation.43 Abstention is not, however, proper simply because there
are unsettled issues of state law.44 If a state court ruling could not
possibly aid in the constitutional adjudication, the federal court
cannot require a prior state court determination.45 The Supreme
Court recently made this point very clear in a case where the dis-
trict court had made a finding only that the state law was unclear.
46
The Court stated that reference to the state courts should not "auto-
matically" be made.
47
In cases involving a constitutional determination the method of
disposition has generally been to retain the case on the federal court
docket and refer the parties to the state courts for an adjudication
of the state issues. The earliest abstention cases were disposed of by
dismissing the action, thereby causing the entire controversy to be
tried in the state courts.4s For a period of time the Court struck
upon a compromise between retention and dismissal. The federal
court would decide the state issue but would provide for a further
decree on order in case of a change in circumstances or a decision of
the state court contrary to that of the federal court on the state
issue.49 It was in the Pullman case that the Court first employed the
device of retention50 and it has continued to do so in constitutional
cases with great regularity. In one case since Pullman the Court
has directed a dismissal in a constitutional case but no distinguish-
40 Id. at 178; accord, Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan, 363 U.S. 555 (1960).
41 Harrison v. NAACP, supra note 39 at 177.
42 Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948;.
43 Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R.R., 357 U.S. 77 (1958).
44 Doud v. Hodge, 350 U.S. 485 (1956).
45 Public Util. Comm. of Ohio v. United Fuel Gas Co., 317 U.S. 456 (1943).
46 See NAACP v. Bennett, 178 F. Supp. 188 (E.D. Ark. 1959).
47 NAACP v. Bennett, 360 U.S. 471 (1959).
48 Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U.S. 453 (1919); Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., supra
note 28.
49 Lee v. Bickell, 292 U.S. 415 (1934); Glenn v. Field Packing Co., 290 U.S. 177 (1933'; Wald
Transfer & Storage Co. v. Smith, 290 U.S. 602 (1933).
54) See note 25 supra at 501.
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ing reason for its disposition of the case in this manner is appar-
ent.51 Retaining the case seems to imply that the parties are to
present only the state questions to the state courts and return to the
federal courts for a determination of the federal questions. This is
the logical, if time consuming, method of procedure. But this pro-
cedure has been placed in doubt by the Court's decision in Govern-
ment & Civic Employees Organizing Comm. v. Windsor.52 There
the parties had, at the direction of the federal district court, ob-
tained a state supreme court determination that the questioned state
act did apply to the plaintiffs, but the parties did not present the
constitutional objections to the state court. The litigants returned
to the federal courts where they adjudicated the constitutional is-
sue. On appeal the Supreme Court, sua sponte, held that abstention
should have again been employed as the parties had not given the
state court the opportunity to consider the act in the light of the
constitutional objections, which might have made a difference in
the state court's decision. If the parties had done this, they probably
could not have had the constitutional questions decided by the
lower federal courts.53 They would have recourse to the Supreme
Court, but that is no more than they would have had if they had
applied to the state courts originally. It is not clear just how much
of the controversy should be presented to the state court, but in
light of the Windsor case, it would appear to be risky not to present
the constitutional questions.
B. Diversity Actions
Cases in which the jurisdiction of the federal courts is based on
diversity of citizenship have presented difficulties to the Court. The
leading case in this area is Meredith v. Winter Haven..5 4 This was a
diversity case which put into question state constitution and statute
provisions which were unsettled. The district court's dismissal of
the action without prejudice was reversed by the Supreme Court.
"But we are of the opinion that the difficulties of ascertaining what
the state courts may hereafter determine the state law to be do not
in themselves afford a sufficient ground for a federal court to de-
cline to exercise its jurisdiction to decide a case which is properly
brought to it for decision."5 5 For abstention to be proper there must
be excep'ional circumstances present in any case, but this is espe-
cially true in a diversity case. The purpose of diversity jurisdiction
is to allow the litigants a federal forum if they so desire, and "denial
of that opportunity by the federal courts merely because the an-
swers to the questions of state law are difficult or uncertain or have
not yet been given by the highest court of the state, would thwart
the purpose of the jurisdictional act. '5 6 Erie did not release federal
courts from the duty of deciding uncertain state law in diversity
cases, but rather placed on them a greater responsibility for deter-
mining and applying state law in all such cases.5 7
51 Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368 (1949).
52 353 U.S. 364 (1957).
53 England v. Board of Med. Examiners, 194 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. La. 1961).
54 320 U.S. 228 (1943).
55 Id. at 234.
56 Id. at 234-235.
57 Id. at 237.
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Meredith was followed by the federal courts very closely.s
There was no indication that its holding was questioned until 1959
when the Court handed down its decision in Louisiana Power &
Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux.51 t This was a diversity case where
the power of a city to expropriate the property of a private com-
pany was put into question. A state statute seemed to give the city
authority for its actions but a decision of the state's attorney general
held otherwise. The district court stayed proceedings to allow for a
state court adjudication on the interpretation of the statute. The
Court of Appeals reversed. No constitutional questions were pre-
sented to the Supreme Court, but it upheld the district court's deci-
sion. The case set off speculation that it might be interpreted as
warranting abstention in a diversity case simply because the state
law was unsettled or unclear.6 0 But the limiting factors of the case
seem to preclude such a wide interpretation of the case. Eminent
domain, the opinion pointed out, is "intimately involved with sover-
eign prerogative."'" This "special nature" of eminent domain was
apparently relied upon to justify the decision reached.62 Thus it
would seem that the case could be classified as one in which an
exceptional circumstance was present-thereby making the case a
proper one for the application of the doctrine of abstention.
But at the same time the Thibodaux case was decided the Su-
preme Court also passed on County of Allegheney v. Frank Mashu-
da Co. 6" This was also an eminent domain case based on diversity
jurisdiction. Here the Court reversed the district court's judgment
of dismissal. The mere fact that it was an eminent domain case was
not sufficient to require the application of abstention. The only
distinguishing characteristic of the cases is that in Allegheney
County the state law was clear whereas in Thibodaux the state law
was unsettled. Perhaps the holdings in these cases can be reconciled
by construing them together to mean that abstention will be appro-
priate in an eminent domain case where the state law is unsettled.
Subsequent developments do not warrant reading into the cases a
holding that abstention will be applied in a diversity case simply
because the state issues are uncertain. Numerous cases have been
reported since Allegheney County and Thibodaux in which the fed-
eral courts have held it to be their duty to decide unsettled state
law issues in diversity cases. Moreover, two recent diversity cases
in which the Court has ordered abstention involved considerations
of federal constitutional questions,6 thereby demonstrating that
abstention will be proper in a diversity case only if it serves some
countervailing interest.
C. Actions Involving Interference With State Affairs
The principal consideration of the Supreme Court in applying
the doctrine of abstention to a variety of cases is a reluctance to
interfere with the administration by a state of its own affairs. Re-
58 E.g., Lumbermen's Mut. Cos. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48 (1954); Estate of Spiegel v. Commis-
sioner, 335 U.S. 701 (1949).
59 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
60 Note, Abstention: An Exercise in Federalism, 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 226 (1959); Note, Judicial
Abstention from the Exercise of Federal Jurisdiction, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 749 (1959).
61 See note 59 supra at 28,
62 Ibid.
6: 360 U.S. 185 (1959).
64 United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Ideal Cement Co., 369 U.S. 134 (1962); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office
Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960).
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fusal to exercise its jurisdiction in this type of case is a recognition
by the federal courts that avoidance of federal-state conflict is a
countervailing interest justifying abstention.
1. Bankruptcy Proceedings
One of the first situations in which abstention was held to be
properly employed on grounds of comity was that of bankruptcy
and receivership proceedings. In Pennsylvania v. Williams,! the
Supreme Court found that the district court did have jurisdiction
to appoint a receiver for the liquidation of a state savings and loan
business. The state had provided adequate liquidation procedure
under a state official who had requested the district court to allow
him to administer the liquidation. The Supreme Court ruled that
the district court should have turned the assets of the corporation
over to the state official. "The question is not the ordinary one of
comity between a federal and a state court"'6 where each asserts
jurisdiction over the property and no special reasons are advanced
for relinquishing jurisdiction. "It is in the public interest that fed-
eral courts of equity should exercise their discretionary power with
proper regard for the rightful independence of state governments
in carrying out their domestic policy.
7
Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co. 6 1 involved a question of
title to real property in a bankruptcy proceeding. The district court
determined the fee title to be in the bankrupt and the court of ap-
peals reversed. The Supreme Court ruled that the district court
should not have decided the issue since the parties could have re-
ceived an authoritative determination in the state court.
A court of bankruptcy has an exclusive and non-delegable
control over the administration of an estate in its posses-
sion. But the proper exercise of that control may, where the
interests of the estate and the parties will best be served,
lead the bankruptcy court to consent to submission to state
courts of particular controversies involving unsettled ques-
tions of state property law and arising in the course of
bankruptcy administration.' 9
In neither Pennsylvania nor in Thompson were there constitutional
questions present. The cases were apparently based on the rationale
that it is more conducive to a harmonious federal-state relationship
to allow the states to handle state problems.
2. Specialized, Complicated Regulatory Systems
Another area in which the Court has given special emphasis to
principles of comity is that involving state administrative and reg-
ulatory bodies. Burford v. Sun Oil Co. 7 " involved a challenge to an
order of the Texas Railroad Commission concerning the spacing of
oil wells. The Commission's power to provide for the spacing of
wells was part of the state's conservation program. Although a con-
stitutional question was present in the case, the Court did not give
much weight to that factor. Nor did it make much of an issue of the
65 294 U.S. 176 (1935).
66 Id. at 183.
67 Id. at 185.
68 309 U.S. 478 (1940).
69 Id. at 483.
74) 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
1963
DENVER LAW CENTER JOURNAL
uncertainties in the state law. The Court did give great weight to
the fact that the order attacked was part of a complicated regula-
tory scheme concerning state policies, and that the state legislature
had provided that all orders of the Commission could be challenged
in a particular district court of the state, thereby giving that court
special opportunity to develop an expertness in the field. The court
also noted that intervention by the federal court would increase
the hazard of creating uncertainties in the state law.
The second principal case in this area is Alabama Pub. Serv.
Comm'n v. Southern Ry.71 The railroad desired to abandon several
passenger trains between cities in the state, but before it could do
so it was required to obtain a permit from the Commission. The
Commission refused to allow such a permit. Instead of appealing
to the state courts, the railroad brought a suit in the federal district
court alleging the Commission's order amounted to confiscation of
its property in violation of the fourteenth amendment. The district
court held the Commission's order to be invalid and enjoined it from
enforcing the order. The Supreme Court determined that the federal
courts should refrain from interfering and ordered the district court
to dismiss the action. Again there was a federal constitutional ques-
tion present but the Court did not base its decision on it. It based
its decision on the wisdom of avoiding interference in a matter
"primarily the concern of the state. '7 2 There was an adequate state
court review of the administrative orders so the intervention of the
federal court was not necessary to provide protection for the federal
rights asserted. No mention is made of a presence or absence of
unsettled state questions. The Court apparently deemed the pre-
sence of unsettled state issues as not a necessary requirement to
justify abstention. Unlike the Burford case, the subject matter of
regulation in the Alabama case does not appear to require any spe-
cial expertise. Consequently, a finding that the administrative
body's order deals with a highly complicated area of regulation does
not appear to be a sine qua non to justify abstention.
When the federal courts are dealing with an order of a state
regulatory body in an area primarily of local concern, it seems to
be settled that principles of comity will be decisive of the case with-
out regard to federal constitutional questions. Whether or not there
are unsettled state issues involved is immaterial.
3. State's Enforcement of Criminal Law
It is a general rule of equity that a federal court will not pre-
vent the enforcement of a state's criminal statutes even though
they may be unconstitutional. 73 This is especially true if the only
action threatened is a prosecution in the state courts of an alleged
violation of state law, for the disputed questions can be presented
to the state court.74 Interpretation of the state legislation is pri-
marily the function of the authorities. 75 Consequently, interference
with the processes of a state's criminal law "can be justified only
in most exceptional circumstances, and upon clear showing that an
71 341 u.s. 341 (1951).
72 Id. at 345.
73 Spielman Motor Soles Co., Inc. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935).
74 Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 45 (1941).
75 Albertson v. Millard. 345 U.S. 242 (1953).
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injunction is necessary in order to prevent irreparable injury. r7
There is always the opportunity to appeal an adverse constitutional
decision by the state courts to the Supreme Court so that the federal
rights of the parties will be protected.
4. Collection of State Taxes
In the area of state taxation the federal courts have a guide
from Congress in its legislation prohibiting injunctions against the
assessment, levy or collection of a state tax under specific circum-
stances. 77 The Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman 7s case
did not fall within the prohibition of the statute, but the Court de-
termined that the policy of not interfering with a state's fiscal po-
licy was of such importance that it would not entertain a declara-
tory judgment action to adjudicate the tax statute's constitution-
ality where adequate relief could be obtained in the state courts.
7
11
The question of the validity of a state tax is one which the state
courts are peculiarly fitted to answer and the federal courts should
not attempt an adjudication unless absolutely necessary. 0
In cases where abstention finds its jusification primarily in
principles of comity, the procedure followed by the courts is to dis-
miss the action rather than retain it. This is in accord with the
raitonale requiring abstention in these cases, for if the courts refrain
from acting so as not to interfere with the administration by a state
of its own affairs, there is no motive to retain the case. The reason
the federal court would abstain in the first place is because it
should not involve itself with the states' affairs. Whether or not
the state law is settled in these cases is immaterial. The problem
of interpreting uncertain state law does not present itself once the
court determines it should have nothing to do with the case.
IV. CURRENT STATUS OF THE DOCTRINE
The present status of the doctrine in the great majority of cases,
those dealing with constitutional questions, seems to be fairly well
settled. The criteria for determining whether to abstain are that
obtaining a state court adjudication on the state questions will avoid
an unnecessary constitutional determination and that the state
questions actually be unsettled. Of course, principles of comity are
implicit in these cases, but the Court places its reliance mainly on
avoidance of unnecessary constitutional decisions. Whether a new
criterion has been established in Harrison v. NAACP,"1 which would
require a decision by a federal court on the constitutionality of a
state enactment to be based on "a complete product of the State,
' 2
remains to be seen. The decision of the Court in a later case, Met-
lakatla Indian Community v. Egan,s 3 seems to rely on this principle,
but the case can also be explained on the grounds of avoidance of
an unnecessary constitutional decision.
76 Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R., supra note 74 at 50.
77 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1958).
78 319 U.S. 293 (1943).
79 See Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521 (1932).
80 United States v. City of New York, 175 F.2d 75 (2nd Cir. 1949); but cf., United States v.
Bureau of Revenue of State of New Mexico, 291 F.2d 677 (10th Cir. 1961).
SI 360 U.S. 167 (1959).
82 Id. at 178.
83 363 U.S. 555 (1960).
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In the cases having avoidance of unseemly conflict between
state and federal authorities as their basis, the criteria are not quite
so clear. This is because the Court has taken an ad hoc approach to
the subject, allowing abstention only in the situations of bank-
ruptcy, taxes, criminal law, and administrative decisions. Within
this area, it is apparently immaterial whether the state law is un-
settled or not, since the court's main purpose in abstaining is to
avoid conflict. The Supreme Court has not laid down clear guide-
lines for the lower courts to follow in this area. For example, what
is matter of primarily local concern, and when is it proper to abstain
in tax cases? Although the Court has determined that abstention in
a tax case can be proper, it has not set out sufficient guides as to
when it is so.
Originally, the Court found its authority to abstain from the
exercise of its jurisdiction in the discretion of a court of equity.1
4
All of the cases in which abstention had been employed were cases
addressed to the federal court as a court of equity. Then in the
Thibodaux case the Court authorized abstention in a case at law.8
"These prior cases have been cases in equity, but they did not apply
a technical rule of equity procedure. They reflect a deeper policy
derived from our federalism.18 7 This language of the Court was
somewhat diluted, however, by the emphasis placed on the special
nature of eminent domain proceedings. In two subsequent cases the
court has strengthened the force of its holding by applying absten-
tion when the actions were at law and did not involve any special
type of proceedings."8 These last two cases seem to resolve any
doubt left by Thibodaux in establishing that abstention may be
employed in a case at law as well as in equity., 9
There has been some doubt that the doctrine of abstention
would be applicable in cases involving civil rights.90 Harrison v.
S4 Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943); Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co.,
312 U.S. 496 (1941).
85 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
86 An "eminent domain proceeding is deemed for certain purposes of legal classification a 'suit
at common law.' " Id. at 28.
87 Ibid.
88 United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Ideal Cement Co., 369 U.S. 134 (1962); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office
Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960).
89 See Williams v. Hot Shoppes, Inc., 293 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Chicago B. & Q. R.R. v.
City of North Kansas City, 276 F.2d 932 (8th Cir. 1960); Beach v. Rome Trust Co., 269 F.2d 367
(2nd Cir. 1959).
1t0 See Note, Federal Jurisdiction-Doctrne of Equitable Abstention Applied to Civil Rights Cases,
20 La. L. Rev. 614 (1960).
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NAACP!"' has laid this doubt to rest, for that case involved the in-
terpretation of a state's statutes said to infringe upon the plaintiff's
civil rights. The Court ordered the lower court to abstain, indicat-
ing that the same criteria used in any other constitutional question
case should be considered in a civil rights case involving the con-
stitutional validity of a state statute.
An interesting recent use of abstention principles is found in
cases dealing with apportionment of representatives to state legis-
latures. In several of these cases the lower federal cour t s have
stayed the actions to allow the state legislatures a reasonable oppor-




The doctrine of abstention has a useful position in the judicial
process. It has the capability, wisely used, of greatly reducing con-
flict between state and federal authorities. By providing a cushion
in areas where state and federal authority clash, the federal courts
have made a significant contribution to greater harmony between
the two realms of sovereignty. In addition, abstention has presented
a method whereby advantage can be taken of the respective exper-
tise of the feedral and state courts in the dual court system that we
have. 9" State courts are considered to be experts in state law, and
the federal courts are considered to be the authorities on federal
questions. The principal difficulty with the abstention doctrine is
the problem of delay. The Court has indicated that considerations
of delay, cost and inconvenience to the parties are not to be weighed
heavily when the courts are "concerned with the much larger issue
as to the appropriate relationship between federal and state authori-
ties functioning as a harmonious whole. '" 4 That delay can become
a serious problem is witnessed by the Spector Motor Serv. Inc. v.
McLaughlin"5 and Government and Civic Employees Organizing
Comm. v. Windsor"6 cases. The Spector case was kept in litigation
for a decade, 9 7 and in the Windsor case, after five years in the-
courts, no decision was reached." The Windsor case itself indicated
some measure of solution to the problem by requiring all issues in
the case to be presented to the state court. This, however, runs up
against the argument that such a procedure effectively denies fed-
eral jurisdiction altogether.
A solution to this problem has been presented by the state of
Florida. The Florida legislature has given the Supreme Court of
Florida authority to accept and give instructions on questions of
state law certified to it by any appellate court in the federal sys-
tem."' The federal courts have apparently taken advantage of this
provision only once, 100 but it seems that this is an excellent answer
to the problem of delay.
')1 360 U.S. 267 (1959).
92 Toombs v. Fortson, 205 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Go. 1962); Sims v. Frink, 205 F. Supp. 245 (M.D.
Ala. 1962); Wesberry v. Vondiver, 206 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. Ga. 1962).
93 See Kurland, Toward a Co-Operative Judicial Federalism, 24 F.R.D. 481 (1960).
94 Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., 316 U.S. 168, 172 (1942).
95323 U.S. 101 (1944).
96353 U.S. 364 (1957).
97 See note 93 supra.
98 Wright, The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered, 37 Texas L. Rev. 815 (1959).
99 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 25.031 (19591.
1O Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960).
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